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Introduction
A merger between international companies easily crosses borders and
affects economies beyond their own country of incorporation— even when
the merger takes place between companies located entirely within a
national market and incorporated under the same laws.1 Because a particular antitrust law applies when a merger has effects on the market that the
antitrust law strives to protect, domestic mergers of multi-national corpora† B.A., Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris (ENS Ulm)/Université Paris IV (ParisSorbonne), 2010; M.A., ENS Ulm/Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne), 2011; J.D.,
Cornell Law School/Master en Droit, Université Paris I, 2015. I would like to thank
Professor Charles K. Whitehead, who suggested the topic of this Note and sparked my
interest in antitrust law, and Professor Philippe Pradal, for his thoughtful comments on
the first drafts. Many thanks to my family and friends for their support throughout law
school. Thank you also to the members of the Cornell International Law Journal for their
hard work in the editing process.
1. See Norbert Horn, Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and the Law: A General
Introduction, in CROSS BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS AND THE LAW 3, 16 (Norbert
Horn ed., 1988).
48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 697 (2015)
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tions trigger antitrust issues in foreign jurisdictions.2 For example, a
merger between North American entities can impact the European Common Market and, as such, can easily fall within the European Commission’s jurisdiction.
Indeed, the European Union Merger Regulation (Merger Regulation),3
which came into force in 1990 and was revised in 2004, gives the European
Commission the authority to review any concentration which is deemed to
have a “Community” (or “EU”) dimension.4 In the words of the Commission, the Merger Regulation is a “vital additional instrument made available . . . to ensure a system of undistorted competition in the Community.”5
The fundamental objective of the Commission’s merger review is thus to
protect EU consumers against the effects of monopoly power that mergers
can induce (including “higher prices, lower quality, lower production, and
less innovation”).6 While some in the United States viewed the Merger
Regulation as an attempt to reinforce EU protectionism,7 the Commission
constantly emphasized that it would not take into consideration industrial,
social, or employment consequences when it examined a transaction.8
The Commission’s external merger review relies on four key principles: “(1) the exclusive competence of the Commission to review concentrations of Community dimension; (2) the mandatory notification of such
concentrations; (3) the consistent application of market-oriented, competition-based criteria; and (4) the provision of legal certainty through timely
decision making.”9 The first of these four elements, the European Commission’s jurisdiction, is established when the transaction meets a set of
conditions. The Merger Regulation applies to any concentration with an
EU dimension.10 The term “concentration” covers mergers, acquisitions of
direct or indirect control, and the creation of full-function joint ventures.11
A transaction has an EU dimension if it meets certain turnover thresholds.12 These thresholds are completely independent from substantive
2. See Joseph P. Griffin, Antitrust Aspects of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions,
19 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 12, 12 (1998).
3. See Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EC Merger
Regulation].
4. Id. at art. 1.
5. Commission of the European Communities, XXth Report on Competition Policy, at
para. 20 (1991).
6. See European Commission, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy, at para. 252
(2001).
7. See David J. Feeney, The European Commission’s Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over
Corporate Mergers, 19 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 425, 485 (2002).
8. See NICHOLAS LEVY, EU MERGER CONTROL: A BRIEF HISTORY 11– 12 (2004), http://
www.cgsh.com/files/Publication/39346756-bc80-4fd2-9584-f358ffc72239/Presentation
/PublicationAttachment/05b61f33-f646-4c9e-a7ec-f6b8b0bfce4f/CGSH_CGSH_Paper_
IBC_Conference_EU_Merger_Control_-_A_Brief_History.pdf.
9. Id. at 3.
10. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 1.
11. Id. at art 3.
12. See id. at art 1. There are two alternative sets of thresholds: original thresholds
and alternative thresholds. Under the Merger Regulation’s original thresholds (which
date back to 1989 and remain in force today), a transaction has an EU dimension if (1)
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competition issues, the parties’ nationalities, the country where the transaction takes place, or the law that applies to the transaction.13 The Merger
Regulation thus applies to transactions with little or no EU connection,
including mergers between U.S.-based companies. Furthermore, the European Commission can also examine transactions that do not originally
meet the EU-dimension thresholds.14 If Member States refer the transaction to the Commission under the conditions detailed in Article 4(5) of the
Merger Regulation, the concentration is deemed to have a Community
dimension.15
If a merger meets both the concentration and the EU dimension
requirements, it falls under the European Commission’s jurisdiction,16 and
the Commission will have to approve the transaction before implementation.17 The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate.18 This
means national competition authorities cannot apply their national merger
control rules to the merger under Commission review,19 and national
authorities in the European Union can only investigate mergers that do not
have an EU dimension.20 Lastly, the General Court (formerly the Court of
First Instance) has the authority to review the Commission’s decisions on
mergers.21
the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than
=C50,000 (worldwide turnover test); or (2) if each of at least two of the undertakings
concerned have an EU-wide turnover of more than =C250 million (EU-wide turnover
test); “unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State” (twothirds rule). Id. Furthermore, deals which do not meet the original thresholds may
nonetheless have an EU dimension if they meet the other set of alternative thresholds.
The European Commission adopted the alternative thresholds in 1998 and they remain
in place under the current Merger Regulation. Under the alternative thresholds, a transaction has an EU dimension if (1) “the combined worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned [is] more than =C2,500 million” (the lower worldwide turnover test);
or (2) “[e]ach of at least two of the undertakings concerned [has] EU-wide turnover of
more than =C100 million” (the lower EU worldwide turnover test); or (3) if, in “[e]ach of
at least three EU Member States[,] the combined national turnover of all the undertakings concerned [is] more than =C100 million[,] and each of at least two of the undertakings concerned [has a] national turnover of more than 25 million” (the additional three
Member States test). SLAUGHTER & MAY, The EU Merger Regulation: An overview of the
European merger control rules 5– 6 (2012), https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/
64572/the-eu-merger-regulation.pdf. The alternative thresholds are also subject to the
two-thirds rule. See id.
13. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 5– 7. See also SLAUGHTER & MAY,
supra note 12, at 5.
14. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 4(5).
15. Id. See also SLAUGHTER & MAY, supra note 12, at 9 (outlining the pre-notification
referral process).
16. See Feeney, supra note 7, at 440.
17. See SLAUGHTER & MAY, supra note 12, at 2.
18. See id. at 9.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 19, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J (C 115) 47. The General Court has competency to
review Commission decisions on any of the grounds set out in the Treaty Establishing
the European Community: “lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural

R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-3\CIN306.txt

700

unknown

Seq: 4

16-FEB-16

Cornell International Law Journal

10:53

Vol. 48

Although the U.S. antitrust agencies and the European Commission
have entered into several antitrust agreements, such as the agreement on
the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of competition laws,22 these agreements do not include cooperation in merger control. When reviewing mergers and acquisitions of U.S.-based multinational
companies, the Commission has often disagreed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ)23 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)24 by refusing to
give clearance to transactions previously approved on the American side.
The European Commission’s jurisdiction to scrutinize mergers has therefore given rise to criticism in the United States. Rather than focusing on
the reach of the Commission’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, these comments
have honed in on the Commission’s method of analysis. U.S. commentators and officials have constantly underscored the differences between the
two systems and pointed out that these conflicting decisions could be worrisome for U.S.-based global companies preparing for a merger or an acquisition.25 It became necessary to structure the merger or the acquisition in
a way that complied with both American and European antitrust standards,
thereby imposing additional costs on the parties.26
Hence, a key issue regarding the European Commission’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. mergers and acquisitions is whether the U.S. and
EU merger review regimes are becoming more similar (converging),27 or
whether they are evolving in different directions (diverging).28 This Note
takes the view that the initial conflict between the U.S. antitrust agencies
safeguard, infringement of [the] Treaty . . . or misuse of power.” See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002
O.J. (C 325) 33. Parties to the merger, as well as third parties meeting certain requirements, can challenge decisions of the Commission and seek annulment of the decision.
See Nathan R. Viavant, Comment, Agreeing to Disagree?: Continuing Uncertainties in
Transatlantic Merger Clearance Post-EC Merger Regulation, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
177, 191 (2008).
22. See generally Agreement on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the
enforcement of Competition Laws, U.S.-E.C., 1998 O.J. (L 73) 28 (referencing the 1991
agreement between the European Commission and the United States “regarding the
application of their competition laws and the exchange of interpretative letters”).
23. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 03/07/2001 Declaring a Concentration to be
Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/M.2220—
General Electric/Honeywell [hereinafter General Electric/Honeywell].
24. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 30 July 1997 Declaring a Concentration to be
Incompatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement,
Case IV/M.877— Boeing/McDonnell Douglas [hereinafter Boeing/McDonnell Douglas].
25. See Kevin J. Arquit, Keynote Address, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers
and Acquisitions, 43 CORNELL INT’L J. 1, 2 (2009) (explaining that U.S. officials have
repeatedly criticized the European Commission decisions in press conferences and suggesting that Europe should move closer to the U.S. model).
26. Cf. W. Adam Hunt, Comment, Business Implications of Divergences in Multi-Jurisdictional Merger Review by International Competition Enforcement Agencies, 28 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 147, 147 (2007) (emphasizing the transaction costs that accompany
numerous antitrust regulations where mergers must comply with several antitrust
standards).
27. See Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive View, 19
ANTITRUST ABA 25, 25 (2005).
28. See Arquit, supra note 25, at 1– 2.
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and the European Commission in assessing cross-border mergers has progressively disappeared. Instead, the European Commission is striving
towards convergence with the United States and, therefore, facilitating the
implementation of U.S. mergers. Part I narrates the history of conflict
between the U.S. antitrust agencies and the European Commission,
explaining the divergence and analyzing hallmark cases on this issue. Part
II shows that the U.S. and European Commission antitrust regimes have
been moving closer together since 2004, which gives rise to an efficient
transatlantic cooperation regarding U.S. mergers and acquisitions.
I.

A History of Conflict Between the U.S. Antitrust Agencies and the
European Commission

Comparing U.S. and EU antitrust principles illustrates many differences between these two legal regimes that may even lead to conflicting
results when it comes to merger review. Several landmark Commission
decisions reveal this conflict.
A.

Divergent Antitrust Philosophies

The European Union and the United States have approaches to antitrust with different underpinnings. The U.S. merger policy has followed a
consistent approach since the adoption of the 1984 formal guidelines.29
These guidelines reflect the approach of the Chicago school of economics30 (often described as conservative economics),31 under which a free
market best allocates resources in an economy and governmental intervention should thus be rare.32 The Chicago school promotes economic efficiency as the purpose of antitrust laws.33 Under the American view, a
single firm that occupies one hundred percent of the market is not problematic if the firm won the competition because it offers a cheaper and
better product— in other words, if all other firms had to exit the market
solely because of the winning firm’s efficiency.34 In this situation, antitrust laws exist merely to ensure that parties begin on an equal playing
field, after which the market decides their fates.35 In a nutshell, the proper
29. 1984 Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., http://
www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm (last updated Aug. 4, 2015).
30. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Actions for Damages, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 937, 947
n.43 (1984) (“The 1984 Merger Guidelines are a product of the new economic orientation in antitrust law, if not an outright product of Chicago School economic theories.”).
31. Definition of “Chicago School of Economics,” BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://
www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Chicago-school-of-economics.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015).
32. See Daniel Rubinfeld, On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 51, 51 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
33. See Hovenkamp, supra note 30, at 939.
34. See Arquit, supra note 25, at 3.
35. See About the Division: Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., http://
www.justice.gov/atr/mission (last visited Nov. 30, 2015).
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aim of antitrust law is “the protection of competition, not competitors.”36
On the other hand, the European view, which is more policy oriented,37 does not share the same assumptions regarding free markets.
Government interventions are deemed necessary,38 and the market should
be a “level playing field” for competing firms.39 Regarding merger review,
this approach focuses on whether the resulting firm creates or strengthens
a dominant position in the market.40 Thus, the analysis scrutinizes the
impact of the merger on competitors— the rationale being that a merger
that reduces competition, even if it brings efficiency, eventually threatens
consumer welfare.41 The same purpose (the protection of consumer welfare) is therefore achieved through two different analyses: efficiency in the
United States and dominance in the EU. These divergent philosophies
translate into key differences in antitrust policies regarding merger control
in the European Union and the United States.
B.

Divergent Merger Review Policies

Mergers, be they horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate, can easily
impact competition in the U.S. or the EU markets. Horizontal mergers
refer to mergers of competitors,42 and non-vertical mergers refer to mergers
of firms not operating in the same market.43 Horizontal mergers are particularly threatening to competition, as they cause one competitor (the firm
that gets subsumed under the new entity) to leave the market, “thereby
deadening rivalry and raising prices.”44 Vertical mergers (mergers
between two companies producing different goods or services for one finished product)45 and conglomerates (mergers that are neither horizontal
nor vertical)46 are not as troubling as horizontal mergers with regard to
36. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (emphasis in original).
37. See Douglas K. Schnell, Note, All Bundled Up: Bringing the Failed GE/Honeywell
Merger in from the Cold, 37 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 217, 227 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Todd R. Overton, Substantive Distinctions Between United States Antitrust Law and the Competition Policy of the European Community: A Comparative Analysis
of Divergent Policies, 13 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 315, 318 (1991).
39. See Schnell, supra note 37, at 227.
40. See id. at 231.
41. See Overton, supra note 38, at 317.
42. Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped— A Story of
the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 334 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel
Crane eds., 2007).
43. See Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265)
6, 6 [hereinafter Non-Horizontal Guidelines], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/ALL/?uri CE LEX:52008XC1018(03).
44. See Fox, supra note 42, at 334.
45. See ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 409
(5th ed. 2004). See also Patrick M. Cox, Note, What Goes Up Must Come Down: Grounding the Dizzying Height of Vertical Mergers in the Entertainment Industry, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 261, 262 (1996) (distinguishing among vertical mergers between acquisition of a
supplier by a customer— backward vertical merger— and acquisition of a customer by a
supplier— forward vertical merger).
46. See GELLHORN, supra note 45, at 409.
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competition.47 They can be problematic, however, when the merger allows
a firm, already dominant in one market, to leverage its market power and
extend its dominance from one market to the other— thus foreclosing
rivals.48 When analyzing these anticompetitive merger effects, the U.S. and
EU antitrust agencies have adopted different approaches.
Prior to 2004, the European Commission applied a “dominance”
test.49 Under this test, the Commission would declare a merger incompatible with the Common Market if: (1) the merger would establish or
strengthen a dominant position, and (2) this merger resulted in a significant impediment to competition.50 The analysis under dominance largely
relied on post-merger market shares,51 although the Commission quickly
started to consider other factors and prohibit mergers which, without necessarily allowing the resulting firm to occupy a larger market share, “create[d] a market structure conducive to tacit collusion or coordinated
effects.”52 The dominance test was subject to harsh criticism during its
implementation.53 Commentators argued, inter alia, that despite the Commission’s efforts to make its approach more flexible, the test still created a
“gap” by failing to encompass situations where “the post-merger entity’s
market share falls below the level required for dominance [but] the merger
nonetheless leads to unilateral effects.”54 Others noted that the Commission’s view excessively focused on the notion of collective dominance, a
“legal term,” instead of dealing with “the real economic issue at stake—
whether or not the concentration significantly impede[d] competition.”55
The United States primarily regulates mergers through the pre-merger
notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act56 and through the
legal standard provided by Section 7 of the Clayton Act.57 In doing so, U.S.
47. See Non-Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 43, at 6.
48. See Fox, supra note 42, at 334.
49. Council Regulation 4064/89 of December 21, 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, 1990 O.J.L257/13, art. 2(3), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri CE LEX:31989R4064:EN:HTML.
50. See id.
51. See Neil Horner, Unilateral Effects and the EC Merger Regulation— How the Commission Had its Cake and Ate it Too, 2 HANSE L. REV. 23, 24 (2006), http://
www.hanselawreview.org/pdf3/Vol2No1Art03.pdf (citing Kyriakos Fountoukakos et al.,
A New Substantive Test for EU Merger Control, 26 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 284 (2005)).
52. See id. at 25.
53. See id. at 24.
54. Ioannis Kokkoris & Krisztian Katona, Critical Analysis of the ECMR Reform, in
THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 437, 449 (Ioannis Lianos &
Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010).
55. EUGENE BUTTIGIEG, COMPETITION LAW: SAFEGUARDING THE CONSUMER INTEREST— A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF US ANTITRUST LAW AND EC COMPETITION LAW 282 (2009)
(arguing that the focus on the notion of dominance under the previous Merger Regulation prevented the Commission from developing a satisfactory economic analysis and
from adequately protecting consumer interests).
56. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006).
57. See Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, 13, 14– 19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1914); Norton
Rose Fullbright, Merger Control Survey 2015, 55, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/
files/merger-control-survey-2015-united-states-127392.pdf.
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merger law applies the Substantial Lessening of Competition (SLC) test,58
which focuses on “increased economic efficiency leading to an increase in
consumer welfare.”59 Market power is defined in the United States under a
microeconomic approach.60 Hence, the SLC test prohibits mergers “detrimental to consumer interests by increasing prices or otherwise harming
competition”— whereas the dominance test only precludes these mergers if
they create or strengthen a dominant position.61 Furthermore, the U.S.
agencies and the Commission do not share the same presumptions regarding dominance and market shares. A company would be dominant under
EU law starting at fifty percent, or even forty percent of the market,62
whereas the U.S. dominance presumption requires considerably larger
market shares.63
This divergence in merger policies between the U.S. and EU antitrust
agencies appears clearly in several landmark European Commission cases.
The rest of this Part focuses on the two most renowned conflicts between
the United States and the European Union regarding merger review: the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas64 and the General Electric/Honeywell65
merger decisions.
C.

Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger

In 1997, the European Commission opposed the merger of Boeing and
McDonnell Douglas (two aerospace giants), by which Boeing was to
acquire McDonnell Douglas.66 This decision came after the FTC approved
the merger on the grounds that the transaction would not substantially
reduce competition due to Boeing’s existing market dominance.67
Although the companies had neither assets in the European Union nor any
European subsidiaries,68 the merger satisfied the financial threshold to
establish a Community dimension.69 As to the substantive inquiry, the
58. See BUTTIGIEG, supra note 55, at 283.
59. Krzysztof Kuik, Lecture, Recent Developments in EU/US Trade Relations, 79 U.
DET. MERCY. L. REV. 433, 442 (2002). Other jurisdictions also apply the SLC test, such
as Canada and Australia. See Peter Maunder, UK Merger Policy, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
UK AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 51, 74 (Roger Clarke & Eleanor J. Morgan eds., 2006).
60. U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Division, Final Report to the Attorney General and
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, ch. 2 (2000) [hereinafter International Policy
Advisory Committee Report], http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/
2006/06/01/chapter2.PDF.
61. BUTTIGIEG, supra note 55, at 283.
62. See International Policy Advisory Committee Report, supra note 60, at 48 (noting
that the presumption on market share can fall to forty percent if “the next largest company is far behind”).
63. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)
(stating that whereas a market share of ninety percent would be enough, it is “doubtful
whether sixty . . . percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not”).
64. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 24.
65. General Electric/Honeywell, supra note 23.
66. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 24, ¶¶ 3– 4.
67. See id. ¶ 124.
68. See Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANÇOIS BELLIS, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY 157 (4th ed. 2005).
69. See Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, supra note 24, ¶ 7.
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Commission decided the case before the issuance of the revised Merger
Regulation in 2004 and, therefore, applied the dominance test to the
merger.70 The Commission noted that “initial development and investment costs [in this industry] are huge” and that new entrants cannot realize economies of scope and scale in the short term.71 In addition to these
massive barriers to market entry, the Commission reasoned that the resulting company would occupy seventy percent of the global market.72 Hence,
the Commission concluded the merger would allow Boeing to strengthen
its dominant position in the European market.73
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas decision plainly illustrated the clash
between the dominance test and the SLC test. It also demonstrated the
political pressures surrounding the Commission’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. mergers. When the Commission rejected the merger, a
“transatlantic trade dispute almost erupted.”74 Suspicions of protectionism arose on the American side.75 Members of Congress claimed that the
Commission was trying to protect Airbus Industries (a European corporation and the second largest producer of civilian jets) against the competition of Boeing and McDonnell Douglas (respectively the first and third
largest producers).76 The Commission defended against these accusations, declaring that “[n]ational champions are for sport, not economics.”77 U.S. criticism of this rationale was quick to follow.78 Because
Boeing made concessions, and changed its proposed transaction in order to
comply with the Commission’s antitrust policies, the Commission ultimately did not block the merger, and the crisis was averted.79 The divergence continued after Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and reached its apex
with the planned merger of General Electric and Honeywell, outlined
below.
70. See id. ¶ 37.
71. Id. ¶ 49.
72. Id. ¶ 55.
73. See id. ¶ 113.
74. Barbara Crutchfield et al., Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion of European Union
Authority into U.S. Business Mergers and Competition Practices: U.S. Multinational Businesses Underestimate the Strength of the European Commission from G.E.-Honeywell to
Microsoft, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 571, 574 (2004).
75. See Amy Ann Karpel, Comment, The European Commission’s Decision on the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the
Merger Field, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1029, 1031– 32 (1998).
76. See id. at 1030– 31.
77. See George S. Cary & Elaine Ewing, Divergence Then and Now: What does the
U.S./EU Experience Tell Us About Convergence With MOFCOM?, in WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE, LIBER AMICORUM VOLUME II 147, 152 (Nicholas Charbit & Elisa
Ramundo eds., 2014) (quoting European Competition Commissioner Karl Van Miert).
78. See Karpel, supra note 75, at 1033. See, e.g., Editorial, A ‘Dangerous’ Merger?,
WALL ST. J. (July 21, 1997), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB869410290502431500
(noting the shock of U.S. lawmakers at the “audaciousness” of the EU’s attempt to block
the merger between two American companies).
79. See Peter Pae, EU Rejects GE Acquisition of Honeywell, L.A. TIMES (July 4, 2001),
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jul/04/business/fi-18495. See also Boeing/McDonnell
Douglas, supra note 24, ¶ 124 (concluding that the transaction would not harm competition if Boeing fulfilled its commitments).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-3\CIN306.txt

706
D.

unknown

Seq: 10

16-FEB-16

Cornell International Law Journal

10:53

Vol. 48

General Electric/Honeywell Merger

The Department of Justice and the European Commission came into
direct conflict in the General Electric (GE)/Honeywell decision in 2001,
when the Commission rejected a merger previously approved by the DOJ.80
The transaction consisted of GE’s (the world’s biggest producer of jet
engines) purchase of Honeywell (the world’s biggest producer of aerospace
products),81 whereby Honeywell would become a wholly-owned subsidiary
of GE.82 The Commission established that this vertical merger would produce a concentration pursuant to Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation,
and that a Community dimension existed in this case because the transaction satisfied the threshold requirements under Article 1.83 Thus, the
European Commission had jurisdiction over the merger.
The Commission determined that the merger would impact two markets: the market for aircraft engines, and the market for avionics (navigation and communication equipment) and non-avionics (the rest of the
equipment, such as the aircraft wheels).84 First, the merger “would have
the effect of combining Honeywell’s activities with GE’s financial strength
and financial services.”85 Additionally, the Commission reasoned that the
merged entity would be able to sell GE’s and Honeywell’s complementary
avionics and non-avionics products together, thus offering lower prices for
a package deal against which other competitors would be unable to compete.86 Bundling of products would allow the merged entity to gain market
share; the resulting firm would threaten competitors’ profitability and
could even force them out of the market.87 This would strengthen GE’s
dominant position in engine products and help create a dominant position
for Honeywell in both engine and non-avionics products.88 Furthermore,
the Commission concluded that the remedies proposed by GE (like
promises not to bundle) did not sufficiently address the competitive threat
raised by the transaction.89 Given these concerns, the Commission
blocked the transaction.
In sharp contrast, the DOJ concluded that the market for aircraft
engines and the market for avionics and non-avionics were intensely competitive.90 Therefore, the transaction would not harm competition, aside
from a horizontal overlap in two markets (“military helicopter engines,”
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Fox, supra note 42, at 331, 338.
See id. at 335.
See General Electric/Honeywell, supra note 23, ¶ 5.
See id. ¶¶ 6– 7.
See BRUNO ZANETTIN, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AGENCIES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 99 (2002).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Fox, supra note 42, at 340– 41.
90. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Before the Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of
Georgia, GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision, (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
speech/ge-honeywell-us-decision.
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and “maintenance and servicing of small jet engines and auxiliary power
units”), where the DOJ required a limited divestiture.91 Furthermore, like
the Commission’s decision in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the Commission’s decision in GE/Honeywell was contrary to U.S. antitrust law, which
does not object to bundling to lower prices.92
American politicians and lawmakers reacted violently to the Commission’s GE/Honeywell decision.93 The GE/Honeywell case was the first
European Commission merger veto after U.S. approval and the second time
since 1990 that the European Commission blocked the merger of two
American companies.94 Whereas critics focused on protectionism with
regard to Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, concerns shifted in the GE/Honeywell merger to the analytical method that the Commission applied to
review mergers.95 The DOJ accused the Commission of “coddling competitors and ignoring fundamental economic analysis.”96 Likewise, U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick criticized what he interpreted as the European emphasis on the effect of competition in this case, whereas the U.S.
agencies put the consumers’ interests at the center of their analysis.97
GE/Honeywell accelerated the need for a revision of the EU Merger
Regulation— not as to the Commission’s jurisdiction over the proposed
mergers, but as to the Commission’s substantive test for merger review.
Instead of illustrating irreconcilable transatlantic differences, GE/Honeywell acted as a “wake-up call for both jurisdictions.”98 This gave the EU
and the U.S. the incentive to move towards more cooperation and convergence in antitrust regulation for cross-border mergers.
II. Towards a Transatlantic Antitrust Authority?
Reacting to these inconsistent outcomes, the U.S. and EU antitrust
authorities realized the need for convergence between both antitrust
91. See Fox, supra note 42, at 338.
92. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 154 (explaining that U.S. law sees bundling
as anticompetitive only when causing price increases, and citing as an example the Time
Warner/Turner merger, for which “the FTC required a consent decree prohibiting bundling out of concern that the combined entity would use ‘its newly-acquired stable of
“marquee” channels to raise prices by bundling’”) (quoting Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Time Warner, Inc., et al., Docket No. C-3709
(Sept. 12, 1996), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1996/09/
twanalys.pdf).
93. See id.
94. See EU Blocks $41 Billion GE-Honeywell Merger, FOX NEWS (July 3, 2001), http://
www.foxnews.com/story/2001/07/03/eu-blocks-41-billion-ge-honeywell-merger.html
(mentioning that the WorldCom/Sprint deal had been the only U.S. deal blocked by the
Commission since 1990).
95. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 154– 55.
96. See Jonathan Krim, Microsoft and the Big Pond, THE WASH. POST (May 17, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2002/05/17/microsoft-and-thebig-pond/603b1b00-4a23-4ce7-8665-04ab5f159f6d/. See also Arquit, supra note 25, at 2
(explaining that U.S. officials have heavily criticized the Commission’s decisions and
suggested that “once Europe gets it right it will adopt the U.S. approach”).
97. See Crutchfield et al., supra note 74, at 597.
98. Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 155.
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regimes.99 If the divergence had continued, it could have deterred firms
from engaging in these cross-border transactions and thus would have negatively impacted the world economy.100 A practice of “soft convergence”101 was progressively established, whereby the Commission’s review
of U.S. mergers began moving closer towards the American standard of
merger review.
A.

A Strengthened Transatlantic Cooperation

Several elements point towards greater convergence and cooperation
between the U.S. and EU competition agencies. As early as 1991, the
United States and the European Union entered into several bilateral agreements, including the an agreement regulating the application of competition laws.102 In 1999, in order to enhance cooperation in merger review,
the United States and the European Union created a “Merger Working
Group,”103 with the purpose of sharing their respective experiences on
merger review. The group issued a best practices document in 2002 concerning bilateral cooperation in merger cases.104 This document covers
communication between the reviewing agencies, coordination on timing,
collection and evaluation of evidence, and the consistency of remedies
when both the United States and European Commission review the same
merger transaction.105
Real change occurred, however, after the GE/Honeywell case. In 2001,
the Commission adopted a Green Paper on the review of the Merger Regulation, the goal of which was to modify the Merger Regulation so as to
“meet the challenges posed by global mergers, monetary union, market
integration, enlargement and the need to cooperate with other jurisdic99. See, e.g., Mario Monti, Address Before the UCLA Law First Annual Institute on
US and EU Antitrust Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, Convergence in EU-US Antitrust Policy Regarding Mergers and Acquisitions: An EU Perspective, (Feb. 28, 2004).
See also Mario Monti, Policy Briefs: Prospects for Transatlantic Competition Policy, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 2001), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/print.
cfm?ResearchId=74&doc=Pub. Monti states:
Globalization and the growth in these cross-border mergers present major challenges for competition authorities around the world and have highlighted the
importance of seeking to ensure a degree of convergence and coordination
among the world’s competition law enforcement systems, particularly between
the EU and US antitrust authorities. Id.
100. See Tritell, supra note 27, at 25.
101. See id.
102. See Charles S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at a Conference on Competition Policy in the Global Trading
System: Perspectives from Japan, the United States, and the European Union, Improving
Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, (June 23, 2000), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/
improving-bilateral-antitrust-cooperation.
103. See John J. Parisi, International Regulation of Mergers: More Convergence, Less
Conflict, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 509, 521 (2005).
104. U.S.-EU MERGER WORKING GROUP, BEST PRACTICES ON COOPERATION IN MERGER
INVESTIGATIONS (2002), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/best_prac
tices_2011_en.pdf. Another revised version of the Best Practices was issued in 2011.
105. See id.
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tions.”106 The Green Paper invited a “thorough debate” of the substantive
test of the Merger Regulation, and discussed the respective merits of the
dominance test and the SLC test.107
In 2004, the Commission adopted a new test, the Significant Impediment to Effective Competition (SIEC) test.108 The SIEC test focuses on a
transaction’s effects on competition, rather than on the structure of the
market.109 The Commission intended with this new test to fill the aforementioned “gap” in the dominance test.110 The test prohibits mergers that
“significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position . . . .”111 The Commission presented the SIEC
test as a reformed dominance test,112 thus indicating that the SIEC test preserved continuity with its predecessor. The creation or strengthening of a
dominant position, however, which was at the core of the SLC test, is only
one example of a significant impediment to effective competition under the
new approach, and the SIEC lists other factors for the appraisal of mergers.113 These factors include: (1) “the market position of the undertakings
concerned and their economic and financial power,” (2) “the alternatives
available to suppliers and users,” (3) “their access to supplies or markets,”
(4) “any legal or other barriers to entry,” (5) “supply and demand trends
for the relevant goods and services,” (6) “the interests of the intermediate
and ultimate consumers,” and (7) “the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers’ advantage and does not
form an obstacle to competition.”114 Despite these differences, the SIEC
test is fairly similar to the SLC test— some commentators even find them to
be “substantively identical.”115
The major shift occurred when the Commission issued the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines in 2004, providing an economic framework for the
application of its new merger control policy.116 The Commission’s 2004
106. Commission Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89,
at 4, COM (2001), 745/6 final (Dec. 11, 2001), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0745&from=EN.
107. See id. at 36– 40.
108. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 2(3).
109. See IOANNIS KOKKORIS, MERGER CONTROL IN EUROPE: THE GAP IN THE ECMR AND
NATIONAL MERGER LEGISLATIONS 45 (2011).
110. See id.
111. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 2(3).
112. See KOKKORIS, supra note 109, at 45.
113. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 3, at art. 2(1)(b); KOKKORIS, supra note
109, at 45.
114. Id.
115. See Philip Marsden & Peter Whelan, Re-Examining Trans-Atlantic Similarities and
Divergences in Substantive and Procedural Competition Law, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 31
(2009).
116. Commission Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J.
(C 31) [hereinafter Horizontal Guidelines], http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02)&from=EN.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-3\CIN306.txt

710

unknown

Seq: 14

16-FEB-16

Cornell International Law Journal

10:53

Vol. 48

Guidelines lay out a six-step analysis for reviewing horizontal mergers.117
First, the Commission considers the impact of the transaction on competitors through the analysis of the resulting market share and concentration
levels;118 second, the Commission asks whether the merger is likely to
result in anti-competitive effects;119 third, whether customers will likely
counter the buyer’s increased market power;120 fourth, whether new competitors will be able to enter the post-merger market;121 fifth, whether the
transaction will result in efficiencies;122 and sixth, whether a failing firm
defense applies.123 This analysis seems directly comparable with provisions in the U.S. merger guidelines issued in 1992 and revised in 1997—
particularly the analytical steps for the failing firm defense and efficiencies.124 In 2008, the Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers (in other words, vertical and conglomerate mergers) complemented the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.125 Here again, commentators emphasized
that the non-horizontal merger Guidelines were progressively embracing
the U.S. approach by moving away from the conglomerate effects theories.126 Furthermore, the Commission’s analyses, for example in decisions
such as Oracle/Soft127 and Sony/BMG,128 have shown “increasing sophistication,”129 with a substantial reliance on empirical data— thus getting
closer to the U.S. agencies’ method of merger review.130 Thanks to the
changes that the Commission made to the legal standard, the European
Commission and the FTC (or DOJ) now usually agree on U.S. mergers.131
Notably, they have reached consistent outcomes in subsequent conglomerate and vertical merger cases, which used to be particularly conflicting
117. See id. ¶¶ 14– 91. See also Kathryn Fugina, Comment, Merger Control Review in
the United States and the European Union: Working Towards Conflict Resolution, 26 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 471, 478– 79 (listing slightly different steps for the Commission’s
analysis).
118. See Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 116, ¶¶ 14– 21.
119. See id. ¶¶ 22– 63.
120. See id. ¶¶ 64– 67.
121. See id. ¶¶ 68– 75.
122. See id. ¶¶ 76– 88.
123. See id. ¶¶ 89– 91.
124. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N ¶
5.1 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
125. Non-Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 43.
126. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 156.
127. Commission Decision of 26 Oct. 2004 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/
M.3216— Oracle/PeopleSoft.
128. Commission Decision of 19 July 2004 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/
M.333— Sony/BMG.
129. Nicholas Levy, Evidentiary Issues in EU Merger Control, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 81, 147 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2008); Marsden & Whelan, supra
note 115, at 29.
130. See William Kolasky, GE/Honeywell: Narrowing, But Not Closing, the Gap, ANTITRUST MAG., Spring 2006, at 69.
131. See Panel Discussion, Global Antitrust Policies: How Wide is the Gap?, Sept. 6,
2011, at 2, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/05/04/
282930.pdf.
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issues. The GE/Amersham132 and Google/DoubleClick133 merger cases,
both decided after the new Merger Regulation, perfectly illustrate the
U.S.– EU convergence in this area of merger review.
B.

GE/Amersham Merger

General Electric (GE) is an American manufacturing, technology, and
service company, active in the medical systems business.134 Amersham is
a British healthcare and life sciences company that manufactures
pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals.135 GE proposed to acquire
Amersham.136 The Commission, noting that the relevant products were
complementary, did not concern itself with the existence of horizontal
overlapping, and focused rather on “whether or not the merged entity may
acquire . . . the ability and the economic incentive to foreclose competition,
by leveraging its pre-merger market power from one market to another
through exclusionary practices, such as bundling and/or tying.”137
Regarding commercial bundling, which was at the core of the GE/Honeywell merger, the Commission first noted that this strategy would be
uncommon in the market due to “significant differences in the procurement procedures and supply chains . . . as well as completely different procurement timelines.”138
The Commission, however, explained that leveraging power is
anticompetitive when it meets certain conditions.139 First, the merged
entity must be able to extend its dominance in one product to another complementary product thanks to the merger.140 Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that other firms in these markets will not be able to
compete and will therefore have to exit the market.141 Third, after the rival
firms have exited the market, “the merged firm must be able to implement
unilateral price increases.”142 These increases “need to be sustainable in
132. Commission Decision of 21 Jan. 2004 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/
M.3304— GE/Amersham [hereinafter GE/Amersham].
133. Commission Decision of 11 Mar. 2008 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/
M.4731— Google/DoubleClick [hereinafter Google/DoubleClick].
134. GE/Amersham, supra note 132, ¶ 3.
135. See id. ¶ 4.
136. See id. ¶ 5.
137. Id. ¶ 31.
138. Id. ¶ 35.
139. Id. ¶ 37. Leverage in this context means “a firm’s ability to use restrictive practices to leverage its monopoly power from one (already dominated) market to another
(non-dominated) market.” Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 515 (1985) (explaining that leverage can be accomplished
through the use of tying arrangements, which is when “a firm with monopoly power
over one product is observed selling it to customers only on the condition that they
purchase another of the firm’s products as well[,]” and also that non-horizontal mergers
are often anticompetitive because they are conducive to leveraging practices).
140. GE/Amersham, supra note 132, ¶ 37.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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the long term, without being challenged by the likelihood of new rivals
entering the market or previously marginalized [rivals] re-entering the
market.”143
In this case, the European Commission held that the merger did not
meet those three conditions.144 The Commission concluded that GE and
Amersham did not hold a dominant position in their respective pre-merger
markets.145 It also noted that there were enough rivals that would be able
to respond to any bundling attempts.146 Market conditions would thus not
foreclose competitors by pushing them out of the market. Finally, even if
bundling could actually threaten competitors’ market share in the short
term and in the national markets, it would neither do so globally nor in the
long term.147 The markets are characterized by low barriers to entry; in
the long term, other firms are likely to enter or re-enter the markets, thus
forcing the competitors to lower their high prices.148 The Commission
hence concluded that the merger did not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, and it approved the transaction.149
Although Amersham is a British company and the transaction is not
technically a merger of two U.S. companies, the European Commission’s
analysis is significant because it shows how the Commission began following an approach closer to U.S. antitrust analysis. With this case, the Commission started to de-emphasize conglomerate effects in its merger
review.150 Instead of blankly rejecting all conglomerate mergers as
anticompetitive, the Commission carefully outlined the conditions under
which these kinds of mergers can allow the resulting firm to leverage market power.151 Likewise, the 2008 Guidelines on non-horizontal mergers
emphasized that “conglomerate mergers in the majority of circumstances
will not lead to any competition problems,”152 although without plainly
rejecting conglomerate effects theories as a basis for blocking mergers.153
This evolution in the Commission’s assessment of conglomerate mergers is
in line with the American approach. U.S. agencies traditionally consider
that most of the conglomerate mergers do not harm competition, as they
recognize the efficiencies created by some conglomerate mergers.154
143. Id.
144. See id. ¶¶ 38– 42.
145. See id. ¶ 38.
146. See id. ¶ 39.
147. See id. ¶ 40.
148. See id. ¶ 41.
149. See id. ¶ 62.
150. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 156.
151. GE/Amersham, supra note 132, ¶¶ 38– 41.
152. Non-Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 43, at 21 (emphasis added).
153. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 156.
154. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address Before the George Mason University Symposium, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It’s a Long Way From Chicago To Brussels (Nov.
9, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/conglomerate-mergers-and-range-effectsits-long-way-chicago-brussels.
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Furthermore, the Google/Double Click merger case illustrates the convergence between U.S. antitrust agencies and the European Commission in
another type of mergers— vertical mergers.
C.

Google/DoubleClick Merger

This planned merger involved two U.S. corporations.155 Google is the
most well-known Internet search engine in use today, and is used free of
charge.156 The company collects almost all of its revenues from online
advertising.157 Google provides space for advertisements on its websites
(as a publisher) or through its AdSense network (as an intermediary).158
Google allows advertisers to place their ads on Google pages, while
AdSense allows participating publishers to have targeted ads placed on
their websites.159 Google thus sells ad space on partner websites thanks to
AdSense.160 Conversely, DoubleClick offers online advertising tools to
website publishers, advertisers, and advertising agencies, so that the ad
“appears . . . onto the publisher website space at the right place at the right
time.”161 Google planned to acquire DoubleClick.162
Five European Community Member States (Germany, Spain, Greece,
Portugal, and the United Kingdom) chose to refer the case to the Commission under Article 4(5) of the Merger Regulation because of the proposed
merger’s potential impact.163 The Commission found that Google and
DoubleClick had a vertical relationship.164 Google and DoubleClick were
acting in two distinct markets, so they were not direct competitors.165
Rather, the two companies’ roles were complementary— an advertiser (like
Google) selling ad space subsequently used ad service technology (like the
one provided by DoubleClick).166 In other words, the products sold by ad
serving space suppliers and ad serving technology suppliers do not overlap
even though they are related.167
In line with the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission
examined the merged entity’s incentive and ability to engage in exclusionary strategies.168 Firstly, the Commission noted that DoubleClick “face[d]
155. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶¶ 4– 5.
156. See id. ¶ 4; FRANCESCO RUSSO ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION DECISIONS ON COMPETITION: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK ANTITRUST AND MERGER CASES 148 (2010).
157. See Google/Doubleclick, supra note 133, ¶ 4; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 148.
158. Id.
159. See id. ¶ 93.
160. See id. ¶¶ 92– 93.
161. See id. ¶¶ 26– 27.
162. Id. ¶ 6.
163. Id. ¶ 7; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 355.
164. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶ 286; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 355.
165. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶ 192; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 355.
166. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶ 26; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 355.
167. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶ 192; RUSSO, supra note 156, at 355.
168. See Summary of Commission Decision of 11 Mar. 2008 Declaring a Concentration Compatible with the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement,
Case COMP/M.473— Google/DoubleClick, at ¶¶ 17– 24 [hereinafter Google/
DoubleClick Summary].
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a number of competitive restraints and [was] unlikely to be able to exercise
any significant market power.”169 Secondly, because the costs of ad serving tools are not particularly high for advertisers and publishers, it was
unlikely that price variations for these tools would cause customers to
switch ad networks.170 This lack of elasticity also explains why the
merged entity would have “no incentive to offer DoubleClick’s display ad
serving technology to publishers at a lower price . . . when used in combination with AdSense” (through mixed bundling).171 Thus, the Commission concluded that the merged entity was unlikely to engage in foreclosing
strategies.
Finally, the Commission assessed the anticompetitive effects of the
merged entity’s foreclosure strategies.172 It determined that the resulting
firm would still have to face competition from other firms offering the
same kind of bundled products (“bundle competition”),173 and that the
evidence did not support the theory according to which the merged entity
would be able to “exert market power in the long-term due to high barriers
to re-entry.”174 The Commission therefore concluded that the implementation of a foreclosing strategy would not harm competition, and that the
new entity had neither the incentive nor the ability to foreclose competitors175— the three necessary conditions to block the merger.176 Hence, it
declared the merger “compatible with the Common market” and authorized its implementation.177
In this case, the Commission’s analysis is strikingly similar to the
FTC’s approach. Like the Commission, the FTC examined first the possibility of horizontal competitive harm and concluded that it was not a concern because the merging entities’ products were complementary.178 The
FTC noted that, although Google had been developing a third-party ad
serving solution and DoubleClick an ad exchange product that would
potentially compete with AdSense and other intermediation firms, these
strategies would not by themselves justify precluding the merger, given that
“the third-party ad serving markets are competitive.”179 As to the merger’s
vertical consequences, the FTC examined whether the resulting firm would
bundle Google’s AdSense and DoubleClick’s tools in one product, thus
forcing publishers to use AdSense and foreclosing the market.180 Like the
Commission, the FTC noted that DoubleClick did not have significant mar169. Id. ¶ 18.
170. Id. ¶ 19.
171. Id.
172. See Google/DoubleClick, supra note 133, ¶ 325– 28.
173. See id. ¶ 327.
174. See id. ¶ 328.
175. See id. ¶ 329.
176. See id. ¶ 293 (citing Non-Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 43, at 22).
177. See Google/DoubleClick Summary, supra note 168, ¶ 27.
178. See Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n Concerning Google/DoubleClick,
F.T.C. File No. 017-0170, at 6– 8 (Dec. 20, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/doc
uments/public_statements/418081/071220googledc-commstmt.pdf.
179. See id. at 8– 9.
180. See id. at 9.
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ket power and that there was no real incentive to tie or bundle Google’s
AdSense with DoubleClick’s ad servers.181 It added that there were already
multiple competitors selling both of these products, therefore precluding a
potential bundled product from harming competition.182 Hence, the FTC
concluded that the merger did not create antitrust concerns and it authorized the transaction.183 With this decision, the U.S. and European antitrust entities reached a perfect convergence regarding vertical mergers.
More generally, after GE/Honeywell, the U.S. agencies and the European Commission have come to the same conclusions while reviewing
mergers.184 In case of disagreement, they have distinguished the reasons
for their decisions and have even explained that the other agency’s remedy
actually precluded the transaction from harming competition.185 This was
the case in the Cisco/Tandberg merger, for which the Commission had
required a remedy.186 The DOJ cleared the transaction without conditions,
and it motivated its conclusion by reference to the “evolving nature of the
videoconferencing market” but also to the “the commitments that Cisco
has made to the European Commission (EC) to facilitate
interoperability.”187
The most recent problematic merger case that the U.S. and the EU
faced came in 2009, when the Commission objected to Oracle’s proposed
acquisition of Sun,188 which the DOJ had cleared without remedy.189 Oracle was one of three major database providers and Sun, which was competing on the same market with its open source database MySQL, had much
smaller market shares.190 Hence, the major concern in this case was horizontal, as the merger involved two players in the same market. The Commission explained that MySQL and Oracle were not competitors in the
“high end segment” of the market.191 Regarding the database market, on
which MySQL and Oracle were competitors, another open source database,
PostgreSQL, could be an alternative to MySQL.192 Finally, the Commis181. Id. at 10, 12.
182. See id. at 9– 12.
183. See id. at 12– 13.
184. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 156.
185. See id. at 157.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 157. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge Cisco’s Acquisition of Tandberg: Justice Department and European Commission
Cooperate Closely to Resolve Competition Issues (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/press_releases/2010/257173.htm.
188. See Lance Whitney, Oracle-Sun deal gets EU approval, finally, CNET.COM (Jan. 21,
2010), http://www.cnet.com/news/oracle-sun-deal-gets-eu-approval-finally/.
189. See Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commissions Opens In-Depth
Investigation into Proposed Takeover of Sun Microsystems by Oracle (Sept. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter Press Release, Sun Microsystems], http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP09-1271_en.htm. See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 157.
190. See Press Release, Sun Microsystems, supra note 189.
191. Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Clears Oracle’s Proposed Acquisition of Sun Microsystems (Jan. 21. 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-10-40_en.htm.
192. See id.
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sion considered the transaction’s impact to be limited regarding “important
[Java] IP rights” that might involve Oracle’s competitors.193 Oracle “would
not have the incentives to restrict its competitors’ access to the Java IP
rights as this would jeopardi[z]e the gains derived from broad adoption of
the Java platform. . . .”194 For these reasons, the Commission eventually
authorized the Sun/Oracle merger in January 2010.195 Thus, the U.S. and
EU antitrust agencies seem now to be aligned closely.
The consensus was that a greater transatlantic convergence was necessary, but questions remain as to the nature of the convergence process
itself. Was it unavoidable that the European Commission moved closer to
the United States? Is “soft convergence” sufficient, or should the United
States and the European Union aim for a greater level of harmonization
between antitrust agencies by enacting transnational rules? The following
section provides a brief overview of these issues. A full analysis of these
topics, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
D.

Convergence or Harmonization? Taking a Step Back

After Sun/Oracle, it seemed clear that the EU had moved closer
towards the American view on merger regulation. Strictly speaking, however, the Commission’s policy is still not identical to the U.S. model— it
instead underwent a “process of careful tailoring with both procedural and
substantive dimensions.”196 Indeed, instead of directly adopting the SLC
test, the European Commission chose to compromise with the SIEC test.
Some theoretical differences also remain, for example, regarding the factors
that the Commission under the Merger Regulation must consider, “including the ‘economic and financial power’ of the merging parties.”197 This
“deep pocket theory” would probably not be to the liking of American antitrust agencies.198
These differences could explain why commentators comparing the
U.S. and EU merger standards use the term “convergence” rather than “harmonization,” as harmonization implies uniformity in legal provisions or
their application. It could even be argued that uniformity between U.S. and
EU antitrust regulation is not a realistic goal because of historic and legal
differences, as well as the U.S. and EU’s different economic structures.199
Some commentators, however, also note that market structure differences
are irrelevant for U.S. mergers falling within the European Commission’s
jurisdiction— where the scope of the geographic market impacted by the
merger is global, U.S. agencies and other national agencies should logically
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. George S. Georgiev, Contagious Efficiency: The Growing Reliance on U.S.-Style
Antitrust Settlements in EU Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 971, 992 (2007).
197. Parisi, supra note 103, at 523.
198. See id.
199. See Arquit, supra note 25, at 3 (discussing the different “underpinnings” of the
European and American market systems).
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come to the same conclusion.200 If that is the case, why focus exclusively
on convergence and dismiss the possibility of transatlantic harmonization
on merger review?
If the difference in market structure does not offer a satisfactory explanation, other factors can be considered. In order to achieve complete harmonization, it would probably be necessary to draft an U.S.-EU Merger
Control Code,201 or to create a transatlantic antitrust regulator for mergers
likely to produce effects on both the U.S. market and the Common market.
Given the U.S. reluctance towards international institutions (seen as
infringing upon U.S. sovereignty),202 the idea of a superior international
institution reviewing U.S. mergers is unlikely to find support in the United
States. Furthermore, harmonization would require lengthy negotiations
between the European Union and the United States, which would generate
transaction costs on both sides. Therefore, the compromise that constitutes convergence, while not the paramount goal, is less controversial than
a complete harmonization of antitrust standards, as it can achieve a similar
result at a lower cost.203
Moreover, it is not the case that technical difficulty is the sole obstacle
to the desired goal of complete harmonization; rather, “some degree of difference” is actually necessary— and even “healthy.”204 William Kovacic,
the former chairman of the FTC, notes that antitrust law has a “strong
experimental aspect” in that optimal rules are only achieved through incremental and pragmatic adjustments by antitrust authorities.205 The DOJ’s
adoption of revised merger guidelines in 1982 and the creation of a
mandatory premerger notification in the United States in the 1970 (with
the enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act) are two examples among
others of this “continuous, decentralized experimentation” that has
benefitted U.S. antitrust law.206 A transatlantic harmonization, which
would rely on global consensus from international antitrust authorities,
would prove to be less flexible and, in turn, would hinder the ability to
carry on these experimentations.207
200. See Parisi, supra note 103, at 519 (noting that this is also the case for mergers,
including some pharmaceutical mergers, where the effects in separate national geographical markets are the same).
201. See CATALIN STEFAN RUSU, EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: THE CHALLENGES RAISED BY
TWENTY YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT EXPERIENCE 61 (2010).
202. A full defense of this claim is beyond the scope of this Note. But the fact that the
United States supports a dualist conception of international law, and the American
refusal to participate in the International Criminal Court, are examples of American
law’s general reluctance towards international law and institutions. For a more detailed
justification of this assertions, see, e.g., JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (2004).
203. See Fox, supra note 42, at 357.
204. William E. Kovacic, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at Bates White
Fifth Annual Antitrust Conference, Competition Policy in the European Union and the
United States: Convergence or Divergence?, at 5 (June 2, 2008).
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
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Lastly, when comparing U.S. and EU merger review standards, commentators consistently ask whether the European antitrust model is moving closer to the U.S. model.208 But few consider whether the alternative—
the U.S model moving closer to the EU model— would be plausible or desirable.209 Several factors explain the direction taken by the transatlantic relationship regarding merger review. The Court of First Instance’s annulment
decisions pertaining to three Commission merger assessments210 in the
summer and fall of 2002, after the GE/Honeywell fiasco, were essential to
the European Commission’s accelerated move towards a U.S.-centric
approach.211 Furthermore, commentators have noted that a more economic approach has been gaining popularity in Europe, and it seems only
natural that it is now reflected in Court of First Instance judgments, Directorate General Competition principles, and Commission decisions212—
“much like Chicago School insights and claims of the 1960s found their
way into U.S. court decisions and agency initiatives in the 1980s and
beyond.”213 Nevertheless, the reasons behind this European move towards
the principles of the Chicago school of economics remain to be established. It is unclear whether the shift was due to pressure from U.S. government officials in repeated press conferences decrying adverse decisions
of the European Commission,214 or a change in European public opinion
as to the government’s role in market regulation.
Conclusion
Global U.S. companies that plan to merge should be aware of the European Commission’s jurisprudence, as the Commission can exercise its
jurisdiction over the merger and prevent the deal from moving forward.
The Commission’s jurisdiction used to be worrisome for U.S. companies
because of the Commission’s divergence with U.S. antitrust standards, but
this has become less problematic as the Commission’s antitrust policy progressively aligned with the U.S. view.
208. See Arquit, supra note 25, at 2.
209. See id. Eleanor Fox’s comment on antitrust convergence sums up the American
view: “Although there is much talk among antitrust authorities and the bar that convergence of the antitrust laws of the various jurisdictions is the principal goal of ‘international’ antitrust, enthusiasm for the goal seems to diminish when convergence is taken to
mean anything other than ‘Converge to my way.’” Fox, supra note 42, at 358.
210. Competition Regulation 4064/89, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be
Incompatible with the Common Market, Case T-342/99— Airtours v. Commission; Competition Regulation 4064/89, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible
with the Common Market, Case T-310/01— Schneider Electric v. Commission; Competition Regulation 4064/89, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with
the Common Market, Case T-5/02— Tetra Laval v. Commission.
211. See Kolasky, supra note 130, at 69.
212. See, e.g., Nicholas Forwood, The Commission’s More Economic Approach, EUROPEAN UNIV. INST. 1 (2009), http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competi
tion/2009/2009-COMPETITION-Forwood.pdf.
213. Fox, supra note 42, at 359.
214. See Arquit, supra note 25, at 2.
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More generally, divergence between national antitrust authorities is a
central issue in today’s world. While it has been partially resolved between
the United States and the European Union, protectionism now comes from
different corners of the globe. For example, China’s Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) in charge of merger review has been regularly in conflict with
U.S. antitrust authorities these past few years.215 In this regard, the lessons
from the U.S.– EU experience could aid convergence with MOFCOM. Furthermore, many transition countries which are trying to develop new competition laws have their origins in a civil law tradition.216 The
prosecutorial model offered by the common law in general, and employed
by the DOJ specifically, is foreign to them, and they are therefore looking
first at the European model as a source of inspiration for their new antitrust regimes.217 Consequently, EU antitrust law “tend[s] to be more readily absorbed into the newer competition policy regimes,” and a
convergence between U.S. and EU regimes thus guarantees a broader uniformity in antitrust enforcement around the world.218
Convergence between the U.S. and EU systems has substantial practical and economic consequences, which justify the special attention that it
has received and continues to receive from both antitrust agencies and
commentators. From merger clashes to cooperation agreements and
shared conclusions on merger review, a “genuine success story in the modern transatlantic relationship”219 writes itself, which hopefully will last
and grow.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See Cary & Ewing, supra note 77, at 158.
See Kovacic, supra note 204, at 3– 4.
See id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 2.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\48-3\CIN306.txt

unknown

Seq: 24

16-FEB-16

10:53

